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Part of the collection of the Iveagh Bequest at Kenwood 
House, London, and now commonly dated after 1665, 
this fascinating self-portrait by the old Rembrandt1 is 
merely the third (and last) one in which he represents 
himself directly as a painter, with palette, brushes and 
mahlstick in hand (Fig. 1). In this regard it is only pre-
ceded by the 1660 self-portrait at the Louvre (Fig. 2), 
poignant despite its simplicity2 and the famous, so-
called Laughing Self-Portrait (1662–63) of Cologne 
(Fig. 3), in which he appears in a setting that might be 
a studio, in the role of Zeuxis, the legendary antique 
painter who laughed himself to death.3 Though sev-
eral of his earlier self-portraits already served the rep-
resentation of his vocation and social standing, the 
work of painting became an explicit subject only in the 
work of the old Rembrandt – and it is unclear why.4 
There is, in any case, a strong temptation to relate this 
curious iconographic development also to the excep-
tional painterly complexity of these late, self-reflective 
works – and I myself wish to succumb to this tempta-
tion in this paper, apropos of the Kenwood painting.
Because the temptation is generated by the works 
themselves. And if we want to respond to them, we 
cannot but start from the immediate visual charac-
teristics of the paintings, from our elementary expe-
riences as viewers. If, for instance, we step before 
the painting to be discussed, the one at Kenwood 
House, there will certainly be one thing we cannot but 
acknowledge: the extraordinary liveliness of the figure 
(“Rembrandt”). We cannot but agree with the succinct 
characterization of one of the most recent monographs 
on the self-portraits, by H. Perry Chapman: “His fron-
tal, three-quarter-length pose creates an overwhelm-
ing, immediate presence. He stands, confronting the 
viewer, his arms positioned to broaden his already 
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massive body. The assertive handling of the face, built 
up with thick impasto and incised with the butt end of 
the brush, focuses our attention on his direct gaze.”5 
Personal immediacy, the obviousness of presence is 
the first and most powerful experience of the viewer of 
Rembrandt’s late portraits: the robust build of a man 
who has seen much, along with his piercing look, have 
such magnetism which practically makes all other 
details – the clothes, the tools, the circles in the back-
ground, the mode of painting – appear as secondary 
Fig. 1. Rembrandt: Self-Portrait with Two Circles, 1665; oil on canvas, 114.3×94 cm;  
London, Kenwood House, Iveagh Bequest
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circumstances, indifferent contingencies. So powerful 
is this effect that for long decades, the discourse on the 
late Rembrandt’s self-portraits was all but exclusively 
determined by the persistent notion of a confessional 
lyrical “I” in the centre. The idea, in other words, that 
the picture suggests a painter who speaks, if silently. 
There have been a number of attempts at “hearing,” so 
to speak, what the painting says, to convert the subjec-
tive confession into a verbal form, which we are wit-
nesses to while looking at the image.
Naive and absurd as the idea is, it is also inevi-
table; nor was it alien to Rembrandt’s contemporar-
ies already. There is, after all, no portrait that does 
not occupy a position on an expectation horizon of a 
“speech situation” shared by the model and the viewer, 
of their mutual presence; none that does not rely on 
the shared nature of certain reception attitudes, and 
historically established interpretation routines. We 
have learnt much about the “rhetoricity” of portraits, 
the nature and evolution of related expectations and 
norms in the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth cen-
tury. Of course, I do not think that an art historian 
with a modicum of historical competence should take 
the classic hermeneutical position of the translator; 
that as a viewer, his or her task is to be better than 
anyone else at understanding Rembrandt’s “message” 
in, say, the Kenwood picture, and rendering it in pre-
cise verbal form. At the same time, I am convinced 
we cannot dismiss the problem of the communicative 
nature of the painting simply by saying that art his-
torians have nothing to do with poetic fabrications. 
The challenge of the speaking painting is as obvious 
today as at any time before: this is then what we must 
question first.
Fig. 2. Rembrandt: Self-Portrait with Easel, 1660;  
oil on canvas, 110.9×90.6 cm; Paris, Louvre
Fig. 3. Rembrandt: Self-Portrait as Zeuxis, 1662–63; oil on 
canvas, 82.5×65 cm; Köln, Wallraf-Richartz Museum
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We do not know which self-portrait of the old Rem-
brandt prompted the renowned Hungarian author 
Sándor Bródy to commit to paper the lines quoted in 
the motto. Nor does it probably matter: after all, the 
lyrical confession of the old man who mutters before 
his own self-portrait boils down to the fact of life that 
“you are both this and that”; to the essential experience 
that in the painted face the whole of life is somehow 
preserved and presented to the viewer. The short story 
in which that remark occurs is the poetic encapsulation 
of an experience, that of the painter who encounters 
himself on the easel. That is if by experience we mean 
what Gadamer describes as “no longer just something 
that flows past quickly in the stream of conscious life,” 
but an intentional unit of meaning, “a lasting mean-
ing that an experience has for the person who has it.”7 
Looking at or experiencing his own painting, Bródy’s 
Rembrandt is in effect remembering: the self-portrait 
functions for him like the literary genre of autobiogra-
phy, whose distinguishing characteristic is that though 
it is objectified in works of art, it does not dissolve in 
what can be related of it – it “remains fused with the 
whole movement of life and constantly accompanies 
it.” This is how in Bródy’s fiction the work of art disap-
pears as the subject of experience – and becomes, in 
this perfect transparency, “the consummation of the 
symbolic representation of life.”
It is hardly by chance that what has been perhaps 
the most influential philosophical conceptualization of 
high art as understood in the above manner – what 
Gadamer calls the “art of experience” – is related to 
Rembrandt, and in particular to his self-portraits: I 
refer to Georg Simmel’s magisterial Rembrandt. In his 
1916 “essay in the philosophy of art,” Simmel consid-
ers the self-portrait as a prototype of the portrait in 
general, as well as of the representation of man, inso-
far as in this special case “the external reality of the 
living model and the artist’s reality that dictates from 
within are given as a unity in consciousness.”8 There 
is no room here for a thorough discussion of Simmel’s 
aesthetic of the portrait, which he expounded in a 
number of essays in addition to Rembrandt.9 Suffice it 
here to point out that Simmel describes the problem 
of the form of the portrait as a logical “circle whereby 
the inner life must be comprehended from out of the 
body, and the body, in turn, out of the inner life.”10 
He thinks such great portrait art as Rembrandt’s is, 
above all, an experience of totality: it is not only the 
experience of the unity of the individual presented in 
the painting with themselves, but also an expression 
of the “formal unity of perception.”11 Unsurprisingly, 
Simmel attributes great significance to the eye and the 
look as the mediator between inner and external real-
ity, body and soul, the self and the outside world – as 
the centre point of the Other on which we tend to 
focus as viewers. While “[i]n the case of people of a 
more limited life, the gaze fixes exclusively upon the 
object that they are looking at, at any given moment,” 
the gazes in Rembrandt’s (self-)portraits “may each fix 
on one point, but at the same time they see something 
that cannot be fixed”: the gaze itself is “something spa-
tially and objectively indeterminate,” which does not 
“point at all, but [is] simply there.” Now, it is remark-
able that Simmel explains the secret of Rembrandt’s 
profundity with the curious loquaciousness of the gaze: 
“[t]hat the eye speaks actually means that it says more 
than can be said.” The Rembrandtian gaze “pours too 
immediately out of the dark inexpressible qualities of 
the soul” to be even called equivocal: in it, individual 
life as such expresses itself directly. As speech, it is not 
simply ambiguous: it is positively uninterpretable.12
It is consequently no accident that Simmel, the 
philosopher, like Bródy, the writer, does not discuss 
specific paintings of Rembrandt (he mentions, at most, 
one or two now and then). Though he considers every 
work a “closed, self-sufficient construction,” he finds 
their series vibrant with the same single life: “just as the 
whole life flows into each moment that is represented 
as a picture, so it also flows further into the next paint-
ing – dissolving, as it were, into an uninterrupted life 
in which the paintings rarely denote a pause. It never 
is; it is always becoming.”13 It is precisely in the name 
of the aesthetic totality of the individual, closed work 
of art that Simmel rejects the well-established prac-
tice of art history wherein the pictures are read together 
through the lens of biography or stylistic history14 – 
implicitly rejecting the reading of Rembrandt by the 
monographer Carl Neumann as well. Six years later, 
in 1922, Neumann responded by criticizing Simmel 
for being normative and ahistorical in disregarding all 
genealogy and context to treat Rembrandt’s late style as 
absolute, as the realization of the artist’s “true” spirit.15
UNDER THE SPELL OF CONFESSIONS
“Do you remember? back then... That too was you. This too was you. You are both this and that. Is it fair for someone to be such 
a human-faced, old dog? A piece of rag. Even your hand is trembling. It is not even your hand as it was, I don’t recognize it!”6
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It may indeed be so that art historians cannot act 
like writers or philosophers: after all, they need to 
tackle the historical sequence of works. The most obvi-
ous and common solution is to collate each and every 
painting with the others and embed them in the biog-
raphy of the painter, as it were, in a kind of framework 
of “spiritual-intellectual development.” There is some-
thing irresistibly attractive in this option: accurately 
dating Rembrandt’s self-portraits, ordering them, and 
finding correspondences with known biographical 
facts, does without doubt hold out the promise of a 
readable continuous narrative of the artist’s own life, 
his self-reflective commentary on it.16
One of the most illuminating attempts in this 
regard is Wilhelm Pinder’s, who in his 1943 mono-
graph, Rembrandts Selbstbildnisse, applies the well-
established phrase of “a complete autobiography 
in visible form”17 to the corpus of the self-portraits. 
Actually, Pinder proceeds in the spirit of Diltheyan 
psychological-philosophical hermeneutics. Accu-
rately capturing the development of form and recon-
structing the “life connections” help him to read the 
essence [Wesen] of Rembrandt’s character. He identi-
fies his task understanding not so much the works as 
the author who expresses himself in, or by means of, 
them.18 As a consequence, he too cannot escape the 
compulsive metaphoric of speaking portraits. Of the 
Kenwood picture, he writes:
“[Artistry] also speaks in the very incomparable 
painting at Kenwood House [...], a canvas slightly 
taller and definitely wider than the late work in the 
Louvre. [...] This too is distinctly an artist portrait, 
but it has a completely different ring to it, owing 
to its apparent different relationship to death. It is 
as if Rembrandt were withdrawing into the depth 
of the space, quietly, before our very eyes. There is 
no relentless introspection; what takes place here 
is a solemn self-exoneration in the face of death. 
Here is not only the force of whose presence he 
must take advantage as it is time do so; rather, 
it is a force that is already vanishing, has begun 
to withdraw into silence. This is not this world, 
captured resolutely and ‘for yet another time,’ but 
the lifting of the cover on afterlife, of which the 
master, a believer, is certain… The easel with the 
canvas, which is part of the ‘close-to-thingness’ of 
the Paris painting, is now missing. The palette is 
there, but the right hand that led the brush can-
not be seen: its world is further and further away 
from things. The bottom of the picture is dark, 
but a light space opens towards the sides and 
upwards, at the height of the head. This is why the 
whole format is wider. The picture at the Louvre 
is defined by the upright body of the great artist, 
so the framing itself is upright. By contrast, the 
Rembrandt of the Kenwood picture has sunk in 
himself, and wants to shrink into a new element 
[will eingehen in ein neues Element]. Like any artist 
today, Rembrandt himself would of course laugh 
heartily at such an interpretation. Naturally, this 
may occur only to the viewers of later ages, and 
it is subject to refusal as much as to acceptance. 
For the painter, when he has to say what mat-
ters the most to him, the language of the tongue 
is completely alien: it cannot say that which he 
silently leads his brush to say. We nonetheless 
attempt to query his language thinkingly [denkend 
seine Sprache zu befragen]. It is the language of the 
simply visible form. A somewhat larger width or 
height may say what the painter would not want 
even to hear in words. He cannot say ‘afterlife,’ but 
he may enlarge the space around the figure so that 
it will sink in it: this is how he says ‘immersion,’ 
‘entering.’ He may lead the light so that the form-
like may extend beyond itself, and he has said 
‘beyond’ and ‘on the other side.’ If we may venture 
to read it so, the 1660 picture at the Louvre said 
‘here,’ whilst the other says ‘on the other side.’”19
What I find most notable in this text is what seems 
a bizarre attempt at translation, whereby the inter-
preter directly converts certain visual qualities of the 
given work (at this point, the proportion of figure to 
background) into a verbal message (while being aware 
of the pitfalls of the endeavour). Pinder’s hermeneu-
tics, however, is only apparently that of the painting. 
Though he emphasizes the essential dissimilarity of 
language and image, he does not address the problem 
of how the image produces its meanings. He registers, 
for instance, the gradual transition of the lower dark 
field into the broader and lighter upper one, the pro-
gressive loss of the figure’s contours, its sinking into 
the depth of the picture, etc. – but rather than tracing 
these as the processes of representation that generate 
an original meaning in the given painting, he imme-
diately compares or collates them with the analogous 
qualities of another picture, the one in Paris. As we are 
used to hearing the same voice while one event follows 
another in the chapters of an autobiography, so we 
are given the impression that Rembrandt produces his 
self-portraits in the same single process, painting one 
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over the other: one gains its meaning from the other, 
and only together do they create a world that can be 
“queried thinkingly.” This is what leads the interpreter 
to the final conclusion: “These two pictures are, once 
again, a pair complemented by contrast, a Faustian 
counterpoint.”20 At the end of the day, Pinder, like 
Simmel,21 considers the painting a transparent film or 
window which he looks through so that the presence 
of the Other may become – by the irrational grace of 
artistic genius – his immediate reality of experience.
ICONOLOGICAL READINGS: THE CHARM OF MEANINGFULNESS
It is little wonder then that such recent art historiog-
raphy that seeks to be more rigorously objective keeps 
a cautious distance from lyricising and speculative 
interpretations of this kind. It is not only in general 
that these writings question the scholarly relevance 
of a discourse that concentrates on aesthetic experi-
ence:22 they also point out that the expression itself of 
“self-portrait” is a category that reflects a nineteenth-
century understanding of art, which demands such 
modern qualities from the relevant works of art which 
they cannot render – not in the frameworks of their 
own worlds. What such contemporary wordings as 
“contrefeitsel van Rembrandt door hem sellfs gedaen,” 
or “het portrait van Rembrandt door hem zelf geschil-
dert,” are without is exactly the kind of emphasis on 
psychological individuality which is in the focus of 
interpretations like Simmel’s and Pinder’s: in the sev-
enteenth century, the object of the portrait was still 
sharply distinguished from the master’s hand that pro-
duced it. Nor was it uncommon in Rembrandt’s studio 
for his students to paint much-sought-after portraits 
in his style, to which he then added his signature, his 
trademark.23
It is thus no accident that the recent literature on 
the painting at Kenwood House is very sparing on 
commentary on the presence of the portrayed person 
barely venturing further than Chapman in the passage 
quoted. On the other hand, with the rise of iconology 
and semiotics over the past few decades, researchers 
have taken noticeable interest in a question Neumann, 
Weisbach or Pinder ignore or treat as marginal: the 
nature and meaning of the two large half-circles in 
the background that arch in opposing directions. The 
presence of the mysterious motifs has been explained 
in a number of ways,24 which could be classified in 
three groups.
The first group I would call natural, and includes 
such explanations as Werner Weisbach’s, who simply 
saw ad hoc studio props which were part of the envi-
ronment,25 or Henri van de Waal’s, who thinks the 
circles indicate the hemispheres of a world map on the 
wall,26 which were not uncommon in the backgrounds 
of contemporaneous portraits and atelier scenes27 
(Fig. 4). Kurt Bauch also provided further examples in 
this regard.28 The notion was most recently endorsed 
by H. Perry Chapman,29 who complemented it with 
the idea that read together with the attributes of the 
painter’s vocation, the globe motif may attain further 
symbolic meanings: on the one hand, it can be inter-
preted as a vanitas, a warning concerning the lowly 
worth and transience of things mundane, but on the 
other, it may have a positive sense as a reference to 
the spreading of the painter’s fame over the world.30 
The weakest point of these arguments is that while the 
background seems carefully finished, “completed,” 
these proposed maps lack any cartographic detail, 
which is unparalleled in any analogous representation.
Another group of the readings consider the circles 
to be purely symbolic signs. Henriette L. T. de Beau-
fort, for instance, cites a great many things from Canto 
33 of Dante’s Paradiso, through Jakob Böhme’s vision-
ary mysticism and Persian mandalas, to the concentric 
circles of Rembrandt’s etching known as Faust (B. 270) 
– everything that could support such occult or cabalis-
tic interpretations of these motifs that are favoured by 
her.31 J. G. van Gelder provided his assumption with 
a more solid art historical foundation: he interpreted 
the geometricizing character of the portrait as an 
Fig. 4. Jan Miense Molenaer: The Painter in His Studio, 
Painting a Musical Company, cca. 1658; oil on canvas, 
86×127 cm; Berlin, Gemäldegalerie
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expression of Rembrandt’s respect for Aristotle, taking 
the circles for allusions to the problem of Aristotle’s 
wheels and to the perfection of the Prime Mover.32 
Finally, I would also include in this group the solution 
proposed by J. A. Emmens, who in his Rembrandt en 
de regels van de kunst (incidentally a key study on Rem-
brandt’s iconology) summons the help of the 1624 
Padua publication of Ripa’s Iconologia. He thinks the 
left circle stands for the emblem of Ripa’s Teoria, while 
the right for that of the Prattica: each is a female figure 
with compasses. While theoretical knowledge is rep-
resented by the instrument attached to the forehead 
and pointing towards the sky, practical execution is 
symbolized by one in the hand, pointing towards the 
earth: Rembrandt’s circles would accordingly refer to 
the marks of the allegorical compasses. By positioning 
his own figure between the two ideal marks, suggests 
Emmens, Rembrandt represents his artistic ingenu-
ity as the mediator between the intellect (ars) and the 
craft (usus).33 In 1984, John F. Moffit complemented 
this iconological reading, among other things, with 
one of Vasari’s anecdote on Giotto, which leads us to 
the third group of interpretations.34
These attribute the presence of the two half-circles 
somehow to the work of painting or drawing, and the 
accomplishment of the artist: they seek, that is, a tighter 
logical link between the representation of the paint-
er’s vocation and the background motifs. The break-
through in this regard came with B. P. J. Broos’ 1970 
study in Simiolus,35 which does not even deal directly 
with the self-portrait in question, but concerns itself 
with Rembrandt’s roughly coeval etched portraits of 
the contemporary calligrapher, Lieven van Coppe-
nol. In the first two states of the first print, called the 
“Small Coppenol” (Fig. 5), the client is represented 
seated at his desk, drawing a perfect freehand circle 
on the blank sheet while being watched by someone 
who is probably his grandson. The autonomy of the 
movement is highlighted by the motifs of the compass 
and the ruler, which are hung up on the wall across: 
Rembrandt added them to the composition in the sec-
ond state, and they gain attributive meaning as aids 
the calligrapher does not need. Broos meticulously 
demonstrates how the calligraphers of the period, 
above all the great Jan van de Velde, placed emphasis 
on refining and representing their technical virtuosity. 
He quotes at length from Karel van Mander, a theo-
retical authority, who praised schrijfkonst as the sister 
of Painting, and compared its best practitioners to 
Apelles and Dürer. It is in this context that Broos cites 
a legend Vasari relates about another classic, Giotto, 
and the virtuoso “O” he drew and sent to the pope.36 
This story was widely known to artists and art lovers 
of the Low Countries from the early seventeenth cen-
tury on, thanks to Karel van Mander, among others.37 
For Broos, this explains the semi-circular dark field 
in the background of the “Small Coppenol,” which is 
reminiscent of the half-circles of the Kenwood paint-
ing. It explains, that is, why Rembrandt had to replace 
this geometric motif with a small household shrine in 
the third state.38 He did so, suggests Broos, because 
Coppenol did not accept the print, considering the 
reference to Giotto’s “O” not an allusion to a para-
gon of a predecessor, but a snide remark on his own 
rotund physique.39
Now, Broos thinks the mystery of the circles in 
the Kenwood painting can also be solved with the Gio-
tto story. Barely two years after his conflict with the 
small-minded Coppenol, Rembrandt uses the motif 
of the perfect circle again to refer to the sublime side 
of the story, Giotto’s creative genius; the motif serves 
the mythical-historical legitimacy of his own artis-
tic norms. “Rembrandt took a position diametrically 
opposed to that of his classicistic contemporaries: in 
a so-called ‘unfinished’ painting, he shows himself 
standing in front of symbolic references to eternity and 
perfection.”40 It is in this light that Broos interprets the 
painting as “one of the rare instances of a direct state-
Fig. 5. Rembrandt: Lieven Willemsz. van Coppenol, Writing-
Master. The smaller plate, cca. 1658; etching, with drypoint 
and burin, 3rd state of 6, 258×190 mm
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ment by Rembrandt concerning the ‘Rules of Art’.”41 
It is essentially this interpretation that Ernst van de 
Wetering embraces in his recent monograph on Rem-
brandt the painter.42
The legend of Giotto’s “O” is a well-known topos 
in the literature of art: as early as 1934, Ernst Kris 
and Otto Kurz cite it in Chapter 4 of their Die Legende 
vom Künstler, a standard work, as a modern variant of 
what is perhaps the most important antique narrative 
on artistic virtuosity, Pliny’s account of the rivalry of 
Apelles and Protogenes in Rhodes.43
In 1971 the two stories were discussed again by 
Hessel Miedema, in a short note in which he contests 
the basic premise of Broos’ hypothesis, viz. that in the 
period in question the art of calligraphy was consid-
ered equal to painting.44 Though he mentions that 
the legend of the painters’ contest in Rhodes was also 
taken over by van Mander for his biography of Apelles, 
he – like Kris and Kurz – does not relate it to the por-
trait at Kenwood House. He does cite, however, a long 
essay from 1967, which the eminent Dutch iconologist 
Henri van de Waal dedicated to the contest of Apelles 
and Protogenes, or more precisely, to the history of the 
modern interpretations of the linea summae tenuitatis 
that Pliny mentions.45 (There is also a passing mention 
of Vasari’s version of Giotto’s legend.) Van de Waal is 
interested in how we are to imagine the large paint-
ing that adorned the Roman imperial palace until it 
was destroyed, with “its vast surface containing noth-
ing else than the almost invisible lines, so that among 
the outstanding works of many artists it looked like 
a blank space, and by that very fact attracted atten-
tion and was more esteemed than every masterpiece 
there.”46 Analysing a large number of mentions in 
various texts, van de Waal concludes that a “subject-
less” painting of three abstract lines could hardly have 
won the place of honour in classicist theory or in the 
musée imaginaire of art lovers from the fifteenth to the 
eighteenth century. This, he claims, is the reason why 
“modern” posterity was most eager to find out what 
the legendary painting which the painters took turns 
to complete represented. Van de Waal points out that 
throughout the ages, everyone tried to imagine the 
work as conforming to their own value preferences and 
interests: around 1450, Ghiberti assumed the famous 
canvas bore the lines of perspective construction, in 
1603 van Mander envisioned classicist contours,47 and 
in 1688 Perrault pictured the fine play of lines as aids 
in the service of painterly shadowing. Van de Waal 
calls it the “blind spot” in Western thought on art that 
it has been unable, right up to the most modern times 
– including Apollinaire’s cubist reading48 – to accept 
that the story, in keeping with antique perspective, 
is about nothing else but the victory of sheer manual 
skill and craftsmanship.49 Later, in his excellent study, 
“The Heritage of Apelles,” Ernst H. Gombrich could 
not resist the temptation of adding a further interpre-
tation of the linea summae tenuitatis to the thirty cited 
by van de Waal: he thinks Apelles won the contest of 
painters with a highlight effect that relies on the finest 
balance of light and shadow.50
We owe the most complex interpretation to date, 
a synthesis of the ones mentioned, to Gary Schwartz, 
who in a short chapter of his 1985 monograph made 
the first, and to my knowledge, only, attempt at estab-
lishing a systematic relationship between the stories 
of Pliny and Vasari, on the one hand, and the paint-
ing at Kenwood House, on the other. The point of his 
argument is that the antique story on Apelles leaves 
open the question as to what kind of lines were on the 
canvas, while the account on Giotto undeniably talks 
about a perfect circle (a single, complete one); Rem-
brandt’s solution with the two semicircles combines 
the motifs of the two narratives.51 “The artist as Apelles 
is standing before a large canvas with his own first cir-
cle and his rival’s answer, in the form of an arc, and 
he is about to draw an equally fine third circle cutting 
across the other two. As Rembrandt evokes the scene, 
we expect the third circle to have the same diameter 
as the others, and for its centre to lie exactly between 
theirs.”52 By identifying himself with Apelles, a cliché 
of the time, Rembrandt only adumbrated Jeremias de 
Decker’s poem, published posthumously in 1667.53
Schwartz has another good reason to assume 
Rembrandt engages in role-playing: he quotes Hoog-
straten, who represents Apelles as the master of chia-
roscuro, who depicted Alexander the Great with dark 
hands and a dark head not for lack of skills, but to 
suggest the power of the blinding lightning he holds.54 
What with his status and the prevailing taste of the 
time, Rembrandt stood in need of prestigious histori-
cal allies: in the 1660s he was on the way to becoming 
the eccentric whom Houbraken would describe sixty 
years later as someone who “is said to have painted 
over with a brown pigment [taan] a beautiful Cleopatra 
in order to give full effect to a single pearl.”55 Schwartz 
thinks this may also account for the unusual clarity of 
the Kenwood self-portrait: Rembrandt in effect sends 
a message to his critics, saying he can work so brightly 
and clearly that no one can find fault with it.56
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THE MOTIF WITH A LIFE OF ITS OWN
Light greyish-brown brushstrokes fan out from the 
upper right corner, as if to suggest the wrinkles of a 
canvas improperly stretched – making the impression 
the canvas is behind the figure, in front of the viewer, 
taking up almost the entire background of the picture. 
The slightly oblique position of what may be the thin 
edge of the picture may suggest that the canvas, which 
Fig. 6. A detail from Fig. 1
The above-cited art historical interpretations of the 
self-portrait at Kenwood House seem to be united, in 
terms of methodology, by their inclination to treat the 
half-circles in question as simple motifs, to examine 
them as signifiers independent of their visual context, 
as it were.57
This is in part the reason why purely formal, 
stylistic explanations have little convincing power. 
Whether they are taken to be allusions to the virtues 
of academic creative competencies (“teoria,” “prattica,” 
“ars,” “usus”), to intellectual and technical talent (“inge-
nium,” “virtuoso”), gracefulness (“facilità”), or to classic 
predecessors (“Apelles,” “Giotto”), the circles are rou-
tinely treated as purely symbolic signifiers of the value 
and concepts that define Rembrandt’s identity as crea-
tor. Ignoring formal relations is particularly strange 
in the case of such explanations that trace the mean-
ings of the motifs back to the praxis of the painter and 
reflections thereon.
This becomes especially conspicuous when we see 
how specialist literature treats as marginal the ques-
tion of where – or rather, on what support – the arches 
in question can be found. Proponents of the “map on 
the wall theory” naturally have the wall of the studio 
in mind, or a surface attached to it, yet most descrip-
tions find a vague reference to the “background” suf-
ficient. Those who go about the interpretation on the 
basis of the legends of Pliny and Vasari are so intrigued 
by the symbolic meaning itself of the motifs that they 
usually ignore the problem altogether. This is puzzling 
because the question of where the work being painted 
is could have arisen from another perspective as well, 
as an issue of iconography. If one takes a quick look 
at the Kenwood portrait, it is at least curious that the 
semicircles are “immediately” visible, while the where-
abouts of the work of art is anything but evident. If 
Rembrandt appears in such an impressive self-portrait 
with all his painting tools, how come one cannot see 
straight away where the piece he works on is placed – 
a compulsory component of atelier pictures, which is 
present in all other relevant works of his?58
Now, during the 1949 cleaning of the Kenwood 
self-portrait, an elongated, thin, triangular field with 
an acute angle was revealed in the upper right cor-
ner, whose longest side resembles a picture frame 
(Fig. 6). The slanting line intersects the right edge of 
the picture at about half its length. On the basis of the 
painted profile of the simple wooden studio frame, it 
is impossible to tell which side of the work we can see. 
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is primed in a light colour, leans slightly backwards. 
This argument is undermined by the fact that it is 
uncommon to represent a work in progress as framed 
(though it is not out of the question, as we can see in 
the case of Poussin’s 1650 self-portrait at the Louvre, 
to which we will return below). In such a case the line 
of the semicircle on the right should follow the light 
undulation of the creased surface, as a brushstroke on 
it, yet nothing of the kind is apparent.
Still, it does not seem convincing that we should 
be looking at the back of the work in progress on the 
right – on the analogy of the Paris picture in which the 
wooden panel is marked by a thin, sharply illuminated 
edge –, as is suggested by the catalogue of the great 
1999 exhibit in London and The Hague, Rembrandt by 
Himself,59 by the volume of the Rembrandt Research 
Project (RRP) dedicated to the self-portraits,60 and by 
Chapman in a more recent study on the uniqueness of 
atelier pictures.61 In this case, the large canvas on the 
Kenwood picture is to be imagined slanting backwards, 
towards the painter, while the circles can only have 
been drawn on the wall – let’s admit it, each is more 
than unlikely. According to the fourth volume of the 
Corpus, the most peculiar feature of the painting is the 
unusually light and carefully finished background62 – 
yet the author does not consider what seems the most 
self-evident: the possibility that Rembrandt fills the 
background almost completely with the as yet empty 
canvas, presenting himself before the work in progress, 
with his back towards it. The only one to see it this way 
is Gary Schwartz, who, as we have seen, meditates not 
only on the meaning of the circles, but also on how they 
are drawn: he also considers in detail what Rembrandt’s 
contribution to the painters’ contest should look like.
DIGRESSION: THE FRAMED SELF-PORTRAIT IN POUSSIN AND VELÁZQUEZ, OR,  
THE PAINTING INDICATING ITSELF
The motif of the painted frame was not new with Rem-
brandt: consider only the 1648 Emmaus at Copen-
hagen63 or the famous Holy Family in Kassel. These, 
however, couple the painted frame with a painted cur-
tain, which emphasizes the institutionalized mode of 
presenting the work of art, revealing it as a painting.64 
The frame that surrounds the portrait or is associated 
with it was also a well-known trope of visual rheto-
ric. It recurs in notably diverse forms in the seven-
teenth century, an age that probed the value of images 
for cognition, their ontological status and reflective 
achievement.65 Suffice it here to refer to the best-
known examples, Poussin’s Paris self-portrait (Fig. 7), 
which he made for Fréart de Chantelou (1650), 
and Velázquez’s magisterial Las Meninas (1657–58) 
(Fig. 8). The most recent look at the thematization of 
the parergon in self-portraits was taken by Wolfgang 
Kemp, who interpreted it as a novel form of critical 
reflection on the part of the painters concerning the 
future presentation of the works, their aesthetic sur-
vival. “When the frame appears in the ergon, the work, 
it highlights the fact that the work is not complete and 
autonomous, and can claim such completeness and 
autonomy only apparently... If it is constitutive for the 
work (i.e. necessary for its survival in Western art) to 
define clearly what is inside and outside it, then those 
accessories that bring the outside (the environment of 
the collection, of the atelier) into the inside of the pic-
ture will refer to the central difficulties encountered 
by the modern work of art as it seeks its way between 
self-constitution and adaptation to the problematic 
environment: its own future.”66 Kemp analyses the 
works of Poussin and Velázquez as thematizations of 
the institutional conditions necessary for their own suc-
cess in the future, the suitable modes and norms of 
presentation and viewing. They do so, according to 
Kemp, by incorporating the “position” – status, mode 
of viewing, intellect – of the currently absent viewer 
who will step in front of the painting and will comple-
ment, bring to completion, the work in his or her own 
present, as it were.
As regards the Kenwood painting, it should prob-
ably suffice to briefly recapitulate Poussin’s solution, 
which is similar in a certain sense: after all, the famous 
self-portrait in the Louvre also represents the painter 
in the studio, immediately before a background of 
framed pictures. While he omits the tools that refer to 
the craft of painting (there is no palette, brush, mahl-
stick, easel or work in progress), Poussin does include 
attributes of the vocation that impart complex personal 
references, even theoretical credos. The dark all’antica 
toga, for instance, is a direct message to the friend in 
Paris, a reference to the painter’s stay in Rome, and 
hence, his absence; the pyramid-shaped stone set in his 
golden ring alludes to Alberti’ s pirramide visiva and 
reads like an avowal of faithfulness to the classicist 
rules of painting; in a partially covered painting in the 
background, the allegorical figure of Prospettiva, who 
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wears a simple diadem, is embracing someone who is 
cut off by the edge of the picture – is defined, that is, 
as being absent from the painting. Oskar Bätschmann 
showed how in the readings and intellectual environ-
ment of Poussin and his friends the cult of painting, 
capable of the miracle of bringing the dead to life, 
was fused with the cult of friendship and the remem-
brance of noble friends. All this, says Bätschmann, 
came to inform the genre of the portrait, of which Pas-
cal already knew that it “conveys absence and pres-
ence, pleasure and pain. The reality excludes absence 
and pain.”67 By the seventeenth century it was evident 
that the portrait is precisely the genre that “regularly 
reveals the ambiguity of imitation, the dialectic of the 
likeness, and thereby not only acts as a reminder – that 
is, not only demonstrates death (transience) –, but also 
reflects itself in this demonstration.”68 The same is sug-
gested by the fact that the figure of the painter appears 
before a monochrome surface of even finish – a canvas 
primed in grey, in a golden frame –, from which it is 
distinct in space, while systematically referring to it. 
This is achieved partly by the inscription, which runs 
close to the figure and names him as well, and partly 
by means of the shadow the figure casts on the can-
vas and on part of the inscription. This doubling also 
refers to the ontological status of the living portrait 
figure: to the fact that it itself exists only as if it were 
entrapped between two picture planes – the real and 
the virtual –, and can communicate with the viewer 
only in this condition.69 Poussin made the self-portrait 
specifically for Chantelou, expecting him to recognize 
the incorporated signs of spatial and temporal distance, 
as well as of the absence of the embracing friend, and 
hoping he would be able to fill the voids with himself, 
as it were. Poussin’s Self-portrait is thus a paradigmatic 
example of the classical work of art: its parergonally 
open structure awaits a future, competent viewer who 
as a worthy partner of the creator can enter the work, 
realize its instructions, understand its references, and 
reciprocate the gestures – one who will round off the 
work with their living, communicative presence, and 
thereby restore “the time [that is] out of joint.” Restor-
ing the institutional context of the work also contrib-
utes to this: Chantelou knew what his responsibility 
was, and exhibited the work as the finest piece in his 
own collection, which greatly pleased Poussin: “The 
place you provide for my picture in your house lays 
a great burden on me. You will preserve me in the 
same worthy manner that Virgil’s likeness is preserved 
in the museum of Augustus. This will bestow on me 
the glory belonging to the dukes of Tuscany, as if my 
self-portrait accompanied those of Leonardo, Michel-
angelo and Raphael.”70 In the eyes of Kemp, Poussin 
Fig. 7. Poussin: Self-Portrait, 1650; oil on canvas,  
98×74 cm; Paris, Louvre 
Fig. 8. Velázquez: Las Meninas, 1656; oil on canvas, 
318×276 cm; Madrid, Museo del Prado
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is a classical artist in the sense proposed by Valéry, 
insofar as in his case classicism goes hand in hand with 
a readiness for criticism/self-criticism. Poussin sees 
painting not “only and always as a work of art, which 
offers itself to the future as an integer, a self-fulfilling 
monad,” but “as authority and criticism, the antici-
pation of a future conceived on the basis of a critical 
tradition, on the simultaneous consideration of condi-
tions and consequences.”71
In this sense, Rembrandt’s self-portrait at Kenwood 
House is certainly not a “classical” work. Not as if he 
had not aspired to be included in the Medici gallery of 
self-portraits in Florence, to appear among the uomini 
illustri,72 and as if it left him cold whether his works 
were hung properly, or viewed appropriately, from the 
right distance.73 But then, at first sight, his picture is 
far “simpler” than Poussin’s or Velázquez’s. It is as if he 
knew nothing of the problem of form in the “classical” 
painter self-portrait, which had crystalized precisely in 
that period, the mid-seventeenth century. By this con-
vention, when the painter appears as a painter, i.e. in 
the act of painting himself, he is by necessity reflecting on 
the relationship between the work already painted and 
being viewed, on the one hand, and the virtual paint-
ing it represents, on the other. Velázquez is of course 
more enigmatic in this regard than Poussin: by turning 
the back of the work in progress towards the viewer, he 
produces a paradoxical metalepsis of passage between 
the world before and the world behind the frame.74 In 
his turn, Kemp suggests that the achievement of the 
work does not end with the production of an illusion, 
however complex. “If we celebrate [Las Meninas] as 
his main work (not unlike its first addressee, the king, 
who hung it in his office), then we are paying honour 
to the most brilliant achievement of which painting 
was capable, above and beyond the scope of the court 
portrait. The greatest feat of this achievement is that it 
does not – indeed, cannot – depart from the concep-
tual and existential contexts of the court, as it has vis-
ibly integrated them.”75 
Nothing in Rembrandt’s self-portrait at Kenwood 
House implies such reflections on the “critical self-ful-
filment” of the work and on its historical fate, a constel-
lation that could be called, after Kemp, Rembrandt’s 
“teleology” of painting. Nevertheless, he cannot be said 
to ignore the problem of form mentioned. In contrast 
to Poussin and Velázquez, however, he follows a strat-
egy of reception aesthetics that generates the paradox 
of a painting that represents/indicates itself. It does 
not seek to solve the task by manifestly indicating the 
presence of certain elements, while designating others 
– no less manifestly – as absent. Rather than appeal-
ing to the critical mind or intellectual understanding 
of those who can appreciate “classical” art, he sets in 
motion the dialectic of the visible and the invisible by 
playing with the viewer’s attention, the automatisms 
of seeing. To anticipate my conclusion: by minimizing 
iconic difference, Rembrandt comes up with a “picture 
within the picture” solution that Genette would prob-
ably call metaleptic embedding, in that the visibility of 
the real painting almost “coincides” with what it con-
jures up as represented.76 In other words, Rembrandt 
seeks to divide the gaze, so that it can simultaneously 
realize two kinds of visibilities which are layered one 
upon the other. Accordingly, the main question of the 
interpretation is this: how does the painting elicit this 
“double vision,” and what is the benefit of this experi-
ence from the angle of artistic cognition?
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BACKGROUND
Since the matter at issue is the conceptualization of 
visual experiences, in the following I will attempt to 
grasp the Kenwood picture as a viewer, in the mood of 
aisthesis. What I seek to do is to concretize the above-
mentioned “play” of the painting, to reveal the con-
crete potentiality of what Gottfried Boehm calls the 
iconic difference,77 and which can only be realized in 
the proactive process of observing the work. Imdahl 
offered the term “seeing seeing” (sehendes Sehen) to 
describe the work wherein, instead of naively taking 
notice of the visibilities that are made available in the 
picture directly, immediately, we look for logical links 
that the work does produce, yet refuses to make evi-
dent straight away. This then is a process of uncover-
ing and cognition, not an arbitrary act, and we must 
consequently be critical, and question the automa-
tisms of how we look and attribute meanings – above 
all, we must pay attention to the painting, we must fol-
low the distinctive instructions and encouragements 
with which it orients the activity of the viewer. In the 
course of this cognitive work I will abide by Gadamer’s 
supposition, according to which the work of art is like 
a game, which is to say that we as recipients should 
not follow the dictates of our personal taste but should 
join the “game” offered by the work of art, and as all 
good players, should accept/follow the given rules to 
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become active participants.78 What is at stake in the 
game is cognition – the new experiences and knowl-
edge we may gain while being involved in the “events” 
of the painting. 
The starting point of my reading is a principle of 
phenomenology, viz. that the visual experience begins 
with something that is in evidence – something that 
catches the attention and encourages the observer to 
further activity.79 In this sense, the painting is neces-
sarily the scene of showing, of arousing and controlling 
attention: painters are experts in making certain parts 
of their pictures emphatically noticeable, others less 
likely to stand out. This economy is there in every 
painting, but only a few make us conscious of it as this 
very game.
Seen from this angle, it is evident why every one 
of the cited readings tended towards one of two direc-
tions: both the psychological evocativeness of the per-
sonality represented and the enigma of the “circles” 
elicited especial interest as they are very much in evi-
dence. At the same time, the whereabouts of the work 
in progress is not thematized in research because its 
presence is not so obtrusive as to enforce this kind 
of attention. Writers and philosophers are interested 
in the presence of the personality, iconologists in the 
meaning of the symbol: as a result, practically no one 
takes notice of the canvas itself, which in their eyes van-
ishes in the grey area of the meaningless background.80
Yet the sight of the circles is without doubt con-
spicuous. We perceive different qualities: the “painted” 
figure requires a type of glance that is different from 
that called for by the “drawn” circles. With regard to 
the former, Ernst van de Wetering, the author of a 
study on Rembrandt’s self-portraits in Vol. IV of the 
Corpus, accounts for such features as the hasty, sketchy 
marks of the cap or the painting tools by referring to 
the beholder’s share, Ernst H. Gombrich’s famed cat-
egory of the psychology of art from Art and Illusion.81 
Gombrich thinks such forms are there for the viewer, 
provoking her to complete with her imagination what 
the painter presents to her as consciously arranged 
painterly patches. A great deal was already known in 
the seventeenth century about this practice of visual 
projection, and van de Wetering does quote Samuel 
van Hoogstraten, a student of Rembrandt, who in his 
1678 treatise, Inleyding tot de Hooghe Schoole der Schil-
derkonst discusses, among other things, painted and 
drawn forms (including “roundish, square, triangular, 
longish or oblique” forms) that imitate the distortions 
of looking through half-closed eyes, or at things at a 
great distance – looking, that is, without paying atten-
tion to detail.82 Van de Wetering finds these passages 
“highly relevant” for the Kenwood self-portrait as well, 
as regards particularly the painting tools and quasi-
geometric formulae of the contours of the lower body. 
He also cites another passage from Hoogstraten, which 
throws some light on the different techniques used 
for the head and the face: when a surface is noticeably 
grainy, wrote Rembrandt’s student, the human eye will 
perceive it as if it were closer. Hoogstraten must have 
learnt much about the function of kenlijkheyt (the per-
ceptibility of surface qualities) in perception from his 
master. Van de Wetering claims Rembrandt used the 
same effect in the illuminated parts of the face in the 
Kenwood self-portrait, where “there are countless fine 
indentations and scratches visible [...], the fine traces 
of the stiff hairs of a brush,”83 which suggest the irregu-
lar wrinkles and pores of aging skin. Van de Wetering 
considers this less of a stylistic mark of the late period 
than an ad hoc choice that served a specific mimetic 
purpose: he cites an example (whose authenticity, inci-
dentally, is contested in the literature), in which the 
old Rembrandt used a very fine mode of painting to 
suggest the firmness and flexibility of the young female 
model’s skin.84 However, van de Wetering does not 
really investigate the relationship between the head 
and the face, on the one hand, and the hands and tools, 
on the other, i.e. the fact that the former are composed 
for close, while the latter for distant, viewing (Fig. 9).
The painting is evidently expecting a viewer who 
is willing to enter the game on offer – who is ready, 
that is, to experiment with finding the ideal point 
before the picture whence the figure will emerge for 
her in its living plasticity. For this to happen, the 
Fig. 9. A detail from Fig. 1
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viewer should keep her eyes on the most vigorously 
defined point of the painting – the right eye, marked 
with a conspicuous black –, so that it remain in the 
fovea of her retina, the point where visual acuity is 
highest, while changing her distance from the picture 
plane until the figure suddenly “coheres” in her eyes.85 
This would account for the difference between the two 
rouw modes of painting, the dissimilarity between the 
finishes of the face and the lower half of the picture: 
Rembrandt was consciously building on the difference 
of foveal and peripheral vision. We see as much of the 
painting tools as he could see while fixing his eyes on 
his own left eye in the mirror. It is as if not all points 
of the picture required attention of the same intensity; 
as if the picture represented the complete field of view.
Whatever the case may be, finding the accurate 
focal distance demands a heightened level of aesthetic 
consciousness from the viewer – and cannot but lead 
to a recognition of the link between the “magic” of 
the optical image and the technical precision of the 
brushwork. Gombrich cites a number of historical 
documents to prove that by the seventeenth century, 
examining the “magic of the brush” had become part 
of connoisseurship, and could only be performed by 
systematically changing the focal distance.86
Now, without realizing this elementary visual dia-
lectic, the alternation of illusory vision and purposeful 
technique, the more complex plays of the work cannot 
be set in motion either. Including the one that derives 
from considering the figure in isolation, and together 
with the (back)ground. Note, for instance, how the 
unusually light background gradually becomes darker 
in the lower third of the picture, and the contours of 
the body become increasingly blurred until they dis-
solve in the dark ground. In the upper parts, the figu-
rative visibilities (the torso, the head, the cap, and par-
ticularly the circles) are very distinctly separate, both 
from each other and the supporting ground. What is, 
as a rule, described in the literature as the “unusual 
lightness” of the background of the Kenwood self-por-
trait, can also be deemed an intensification of the dif-
ference between “figure” and “ground,” which invests 
each, one through the other, with the emphatic appear-
ance of an individual identity. There is a reason why 
the almost undivided plane of the background and 
the head are considered the “most completed” parts 
of the painting: they are “finished” in relation to each 
other – one against the other, as it were. The plastic-
painterly density of the head, its richness of traces 
and saturation of facture, can produce the presence 
of the figure only together, or in contrast, with the no 
less dense, yet finely finished background, its planar 
effect. All this is beautifully obvious where the luxuri-
ous, almost palpably wrinkling textile of the whitely 
shining cap clashes with the abstract, uniform neutral-
ity of the background. However, as we go down, both 
lose their massive opacity, gradually and evenly. Not 
only are the contours dissolved, but the surfaces also 
become looser. The visual contamination of figure and 
ground first leads to the inconsistent use of contours – 
as in the palette –, the melding of things and surfaces, 
and eventually to their complete indistinguishability. 
Examples of the latter include the objective illegibil-
ity of the overlapping paint patches of the hidden left 
hand, or the total darkness of the lower right corner. 
The conditio sine qua non of any picture, the elemen-
tary contrast of “figure” and “ground,” which at the top 
manifests itself in the formulaic, graphical purity of 
geometric lines and a white ground, becomes utterly 
impossible to identify. Of course, the process can also 
be read in the opposite direction, as the gradual sep-
aration of the body from the background, its plastic 
emergence, as a result of which it positively seems, 
by the height of the asserted focal point, the head, to 
lift from the tilted work in progress behind it, itself 
progressively “solidifying” into a self-identical thing. 
The motifs then are not simply what they seem – no 
“this here is the figure, that there is the canvas” –, but 
become self-identical or lose themselves in the process 
of the picture, in the iconic contrasts of their mutually 
dependent visibilities, the plays of figure and ground, 
space and plane, contour and tone.
MARKING MARKS, TRACING TRACES
The role of the hand that moves the brush is also 
directly thematized in the painting in question. X-ray 
radiography has revealed that Rembrandt repainted 
the first state he painted before the mirror, in which he 
still raised his right hand with the brush to the work in 
progress on the side87 – while replacing the left hand, 
as already mentioned, with a motley of blurry paint 
patches.88 In her important monograph on Rembrandt 
and the problem of working in the studio, Svetlana 
Alpers claims that with this selection of the painter’s 
tools, Rembrandt marks his own hand as a tool: what 
the raw manner aims at is not the expressivity of the 
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movement of the brush, but a construction of the body 
(“the hand may be a palette, a mahlstick, or even a 
brush”) that metonymically represents “a certain 
action of the hand.”89 Alpers describes this action of 
the hand as touching in quality, and through the analysis 
of several examples, she characterizes it as the working 
method of a “failed sculptor,” who keeps turning his 
paintings into something “relieflike and solid.”90 It is 
notable, however, how she ignores the circles and the 
canvas – abstaining not only from taking a position in 
the arguments about the meaning of the circles, but 
also from recognizing the marks of a different “hand 
action” in their modelling.
Rembrandt plays on a variety of registers, as we 
have seen. In the case of the monochrome circles, for 
instance, he seeks to hide the real traces of his brush in 
the vision of the simple “drawing.” As if he were a fijn-
schilder, here he works to suppress the same dialectic 
visual experience which in the instance of the figure 
or the tools he makes such an effort to bring about 
in the viewer. While in the latter he practically pro-
vokes us to uncover the mark of the hand, the graphic 
formula of the background makes it unnecessary for 
the beholder to repeatedly change her focus – and her 
share. Why indeed should we study at close range a 
simple, regular line, as if we were expecting to uncover 
the magic of devilish technique?
Harry Berger Jr. recently proposed to read the 
plastic qualities of the picture surface as texture, i.e. 
a collection of meaningful signs. Surprisingly, in his 
discussion of the Kenwood self-portrait, he does not 
realize (like Alpers) the evident (though not glaring!) 
difference between the various “touches” that make 
up the rouw figure and the fijn background.91 This is 
surprising, because if anywhere, in this monumental 
self-portrait, which also represents the dignity of the 
vocation of the painter, the artist can evidently expect 
his viewer to distinguish his own personal touch as 
such from that other one, which he may have painted, 
but which – precisely in its linearity – is emphatically 
detached from this “personal” one. This too should 
encourage us to consider the circles not in isolation, 
but in conjunction with the canvas as support, and the 
figure as something that is plastically detached. We 
can attribute meaning to the circles only if we are will-
ing to observe them in their visual context, i.e. in the 
concrete system of their iconic differences.
We saw how the interpreters of Pliny’s and Vasari’s 
legends on painters also believed Rembrandt’s circles 
to be the marks of the hand of Apelles/Protogenes and 
Giotto – but what they saw in them were the symbols 
of brilliant painters’ hands, and not the indices of paint-
erly presence. Whereas it is in fact the latter that links 
the two narratives to each other and to Rembrandt’s 
painting. The two are then worth reading again, and 
reading together, for a more accurate interpretation of 
the work’s message.
I would like to highlight three circumstances in 
the two narratives, which can be profitably employed 
while looking at the self-portrait at Kenwood House. 
One is the abstract quality of the marks made by the 
painters; the second is that the marks of their hands 
serve to identify the person of the artists; and finally, a 
lay person is given a key role in each story, one who is 
decidedly not competent in questions of art.
Let us start with the old woman in Pliny’s tale, 
who is an eyewitness to the contest of the painters 
in Protogenes’ house: she is the one who asks the 
unknown guest to identify himself, and this is what 
prompts Apelles to answer not by providing his name, 
but by leaving an abstract mark of his hand (linea ex 
colore...summae tenuitatis) on the work in progress. 
Protogenes then follows suit: the two can be said to be 
communicating in the language of their profession, yet 
“over the head” of the old woman. It is as if they were 
avoiding each other so that they can perform a game 
before the old woman which she is not let in on. They 
only meet in person when they have finished the con-
test (of which only they can be the judges). What the 
whole thing serves is the differentiation between those 
who are competent and those who are not, as well as the 
demonstration of this distinction. This is why the two 
painters subsequently decide to keep the jointly pro-
duced work, so as to allow everyone, “but in particular 
painters, to marvel at it” (...omnium quidem, sed arti-
ficum praecipuo miraculo). What van Mander himself 
emphasizes in his commentary on the locus classicus 
is that “those who had an understanding of painting 
were very much astonished and amazed by it.”92
Now, in this and similar stories by Pliny, the pro-
fessional rivalry invariably takes place before the pub-
lic, and the uninitiated audience regularly fails when 
trying to give a ruling. The final judgement is always 
passed by those in the know. To accurately interpret 
the antique stories, we must note that in the readings of 
posterity, the motif of the contest tended to eclipse that 
of the mutual respect of the artists, which was under-
lined even in van Mander’s commentary. (Apelles, for 
instance, is said to have bought up Protogenes pictures 
out of professional solidarity, so that he could hike up 
their prices by means of his own renown.)93 The joint 
manipulation of the experts is at the expense of those 
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– in this case the ignorant inhabitants of Rhodes – who 
pass judgements superficially, on the basis of fame 
alone, but cannot tell the difference between two lines, 
are not knowledgeable about art.
The case is very similar in Vasari’s narrative. Gio-
tto’s “O” is an abstract sign again, which identifies the 
painter as a genius of drawing. Let us see the story as 
rendered by Karel van Mander (as this was, after all, 
most certainly the form in which Rembrandt knew it):
“Giotto was witty; he took a sheet of paper and 
holding his arm against his side to act as a com-
pass, he drew on it, with a turn of the hand, never 
moving his arm, a circle so perfect that it was a 
wonder to see. Having done this, he gave it to the 
courtier with a grin, saying: there is the drawing. 
Whereupon the courtier, thinking himself made 
fun of answered: am I to have no other drawing 
than this? This is more than enough, said Giotto, 
show it to the Pope with the rest, and you shall 
see whether or not it will be appreciated. He left 
ill-satisfied. When this drawing came before the 
Pope among others, and when he had been told 
in what manner it was drawn by Giotto, without 
a compass and with a stiff arm, the Pope and his 
many judicious courtiers understood that Giotto 
was the best painter of his time.”94
Curiously, none of the interpreters took notice of the 
conflict that arose between the painter and the cour-
tier, even though van Mander emphasizes it in the title 
of the passage (Giotto treckt een rondt, in platse van tey-
ckenen); the uninitiated envoy of the pope is not satis-
fied with the circle and would rather take something 
else, a “fully developed,” “lifelike” picture. He has to 
leave disappointed because Giotto (like Apelles and 
Protogenes) entrusts the representation of his talent 
to an abstract sign which only the initiated (verstan-
dighe) can interpret. The courtier does not understand 
that one can tell real art not by the illusion created by 
the work, but by the ability to perform. Those who 
do know, because they can read the abstract lan-
guage of technique, will be more than satisfied (meer 
als genoech) by the mere mark of the hand. Giotto, in 
other words, knows that the evidence he must pro-
vide of his talent to those who are really competent 
should differ from what he enchants the uninitiated 
with. Nor is this story then solely about technique 
becoming “an end in itself”95; it also concerns the pos-
sibility to communicate artistic knowledge, as well as 
its publicity.
This is why the courtier, like Pliny’s old woman, 
is given a key role in the story. Their function is no 
more than to bear witness to the fact that the marvel-
lous lines were drawn by the painters themselves – the 
fact that the lines can indeed be identified with them. 
They are eyewitnesses who can be believed because 
they were there when the work of art was created, and 
because they are impartial: they will not judge the work 
because they do not look upon it as art. They are cred-
ible eyewitnesses without being viewers. They could 
be called the ideal principal witnesses of a mo dern 
positivism96 that considers only the unintentional 
marks of the artist’s hand as proof for the authenticity 
of a painting. Is this not what the scientistic researcher 
does when treating visual marks as sheer positivity, 
assuming they will allow her to access the work in the 
pure presentness of its creation? Is it not naive on her 
part to assume that the attribution, the dating, and the 
restoration of the “original” can be carried out more 
accurately if she concentrates more on the physical 
facticity of the work of art, and less on the distinctive 
working of the image? Does she not, deep down, long 
for the simple obvious truth of the old woman or the 
pope’s courtier; a truth that cannot be altered by her 
taste, interests or prejudices, one that allows her to say 
with scientific objectivity: “this is a real Rembrandt”?
From all of which at least two things follow. To be 
knowledgeable about painting is to know that every 
picture has an implicit question which we as view-
ers must be able to answer. Apelles sends a task to 
Protogenes, as does Giotto to the pope: they tell the 
other to observe the qualities of the touch, marshal 
their knowledge, compare the work with those of oth-
ers, consider how it was made, etc., to understand in 
the picture precisely the message: “It was I who painted 
this.” And of course they also expect an answer: leaving 
a mark has its stake, as its success must be acknowl-
edged by the other. Both stories involve an exchange 
of messages, in which the knowledge of paintings 
appears as competence at playing – and both stories are 
also about the success of this game, mutual under-
standing: the two painters are amicable when they 
eventually meet in the harbour of Rhodes, and Giotto 
wins the Rome commission from Benedict XI.
The knowledgeable viewer must also know that 
the work exists in time: she must know that looking at 
the picture, she must decode a message that by neces-
sity speaks to her from the past. In other words: she 
must not identify the painting with the momentary 
immediacy of its effect. The difference between the 
uninitiated and the competent viewer could also be 
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described thus: while the former understands the pic-
ture as a mere likeness (as an icon), the latter knows 
that it is also to be looked at as the marks of painterly 
procedures that are to be read after the event (as an 
index). Since an icon is a sign based on likeness, even 
the naive viewer can assess the degree of similarity 
instinctively, immediately, because she will spontane-
ously treat the portrait as concurrent with what it rep-
resents. Whereas, points out Rosalind Krauss, the key 
to the effect of the indexic sign is time: the distinction 
of the presence of the sight from that of the indexed, 
which was present in the past.97 When admiring its 
lifelikeness, the naive viewer perceives the painting in 
its presentness – yet this is a trap, which constantly 
threatens even the most competent expert. The hero 
of another one of Pliny’s stories falls into a trap of this 
kind: the famed Zeuxis loses his contest against Par-
rhasius because even though he proves his mastery 
with the grapes he paints, the thirst for victory makes 
him impatient (tumens flagitaret) when he approaches 
the curtain to draw it aside. It is the automatism of his 
reaction that is of interest here, which is after all not 
different from that of the birds which start to pick at 
his lifelike grapes. Parrhasius wins the contest not 
because he can produce an illusion that is more perfect 
in itself, but because he is aware of this playful nature 
of the painting from the start. Nor is his painted cur-
tain more than an intellectual joke, a witty reminder 
of how the parergon cannot be circumvented, a warn-
ing for the naive Zeuxis of the permanent play of the 
picture, and of his task as a viewer, critical distinction. 
It teaches him that immediacy makes one blind to the 
actual achievement of the picture – that every picture 
demands its own time.
GAME OF FRAMES AND PERFORMANCE: THE CURTAIN OF OBVIOUSNESS  
AND PULLING IT ASIDE
If, in the light of the above, we give credence to the 
assumption of Gary Schwartz, who thinks Rembrandt 
presents himself in the self-portrait at Kenwood House 
as a modern Giotto/Apelles who enters the world-his-
torical contest of painter genii, we might, by way of 
closure, ask: by what mark of his hand does he intend 
to claim victory? Schwartz is quick to provide an 
answer: Rembrandt “is about to draw an equally fine 
third circle cutting across the other two [... and] we 
expect the third circle to have the same diameter as the 
others, and for its centre to lie exactly between theirs.” 
That of course is possible. Schwartz, in any case, has 
no more “evidence” than the visual obviousness of the 
view: the regularity of the symmetrical forms, and the 
possibility to geometrically construct the third circle. 
But does he not fall victim to the phenomenal life-
likeness of the atelier portrait when he can imagine 
the victorious touch as a figure that can be identified 
unambiguously? Does he not yield to the charm of 
pure presentness when he imagines the mark of Rem-
brandt’s hand as not yet visible on the half-finished 
canvas? Does he not judge according to the normal 
routine of seeing when he considers evident only what 
can be seen immediately, or whose empty place he can 
point at, as it is absent for the time being.
In view of the above, I think it would lead to more 
profound insights if, instead of some future “third 
circle,” we considered Rembrandt’s own head as the 
mark he contributes to the contest. Does he not enter 
the contest by doing what the mythical predecessors 
did: identify himself with the marks of his hand, and 
make these marks, in Pliny’s words, escape being seen 
(visum effugientes),98 while instructing the addressee to 
see them and recognize them as meaningful? Is not the 
viewer to identify the marks of Rembrandt’s hand in 
the mass of abstract marks, a devilish arrangement of 
pigments, brushstrokes and factures? Is this not the 
point of inserting his mark between the two “alien,” 
evident marks,99 his own being both evident and not?
Does not the painting challenge the viewer, 
requesting her to suspend the automatism of the gaze, 
to postpone, as it were, the look – to treat what/who 
she immediately sees not as a self-identical given that 
is offered as something complete? Does it not request 
her to recognize the painting as a game of identities?
To recognize the game is to play it; it is giving it 
time so that it can take place. As good players, we must 
follow the hide-and-seek of the picture; we must not 
immediately fall for what it flaunts, but must seek out 
what it hides behind the curtain of obviousness. To put 
it differently: we must consider it a performative which 
waits to be played out, and which expects the view-
ers to facilitate the performance with intense attention, 
a critical mind, consideration and reflection. In short: 
the picture requires us to look at it as something in 
which we want to see – want to experience – something.
Let us consider, for instance, the barely discernible 
slanting line of the thin wooden frame. We have seen 
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how refusing or not being able to remove its ambi-
guity led to inconsistencies in the interpretation even 
in specialist literature. I have already made a passing 
reference to the fact that this is not the first occasion 
in Rembrandt’s oeuvre when the painted frame has 
appeared. In The Holy Family of Kassel (1646) (Fig. 10) 
or the Emmaus scene at Copenhagen (1648) (Fig. 11), 
the motif – complemented with the curtain – still aims 
at a clear distinction between ergon and parergon, at 
making the viewer conscious of the fact that the pic-
ture both shows a “world,” and indicates an “object-of-
a-painting.” Rembrandt plants in these pictures two 
kinds of performance instructions for the viewer, 
which, however, are openly contradictory: the viewer 
cannot simultaneously be a truth-thirsty eyewitness of 
the divine revelation of the ergon, and the connoisseur 
who can appreciate the secular work of art marked 
by the parergon. The broad frames and the curtains 
pathetically drawn aside are emphatic in these cases 
so as to make the perception of, and the reflection 
on, the threshold ineluctable; they force themselves, 
so to speak, on the gaze, which otherwise routinely 
ignores everything that is perceived to be lying outside 
the world of the picture. With its parergonal struc-
ture, the painting stages itself, as it were – yet the play 
will not work until the viewer recognizes these roles, 
performing and becoming conscious of the conflict 
that exists between the identities encoded in them.100 
At any rate, these paintings seem to be thematizing 
the status of the picture and the quality of the recipi-
ent’s presence, i.e. the same general conditions of the 
operation of painting as a social, public institution that 
Poussin and Velázquez look into in the cited “framed” 
self-portraits.
It is then all the more curious that in the self-
portrait under discussion, whose ambitions are no less 
representative, Rembrandt starts playing with hiding 
the painted frame itself. Now, instead of doubling the 
picture plane in an open, reflected manner, the barely 
noticeable edge of the painting enigmatically divides its 
uniformity. It is a question of very fine proportions. 
Rembrandt, like Poussin, could just as well place 
the fictitious empty canvas behind his own figure so 
that its edges allow a better view of the background, 
Fig. 10. Rembrandt: The Holy Family with a Curtain, 1646; 
oil on wood, 46.5×69 cm; Kassel,  
Staatliche Museen Kassel, Gemäldegalerie Alter Meister
Fig. 11. Rembrandt: The Supper at Emmaus, 1648;  
oil on canvas, 89×111 cm; Copenhagen,  
Statens Museum for Kunst
Fig. 12. René Magritte: La condition humaine, 1933;  
oil on canvas, 100×81 cm; Washington D.C.,  
National Gallery of Art
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such as the back wall of the studio. Should this be the 
case, the accurately delimited work in progress would 
be easily identifiable, as in so many atelier scenes: it 
would not require interpretation. By contrast, Rem-
brandt not only makes the canvas extremely large, but 
also places it so close to the picture plane that the two 
overlap almost completely.101 By pushing the frame to 
the periphery of the picture field, he separates the light 
canvas from the dark corner of the studio (i.e. the two 
entities that are separated by the thin line) in a way 
that reduces their iconic contrast to a minimum. “Too 
much” can be seen of one, “too little” of the other, for 
either to have an “evident” identity. The unaccented 
edge thus fails to evoke a contrast in depth between 
an object brought close up, and the space behind it; 
rather, it follows the edge of the real canvas, and it 
is vis-à-vis the latter that it conjures up the spatial-
ity of the tilted object. Though even this difference 
results only in a minimal contrast effect, as both edges 
(and the thin gap between them) remain marginal, it 
somehow still gives rise to an unsettling uncertainty 
about the possibility of distinguishing the fiction and 
the reality of the picture. “Mais où est donc le tableau?” 
we may ask in the manner of Théophile Gautier who 
enthused over Las Meninas102 – though we would give 
voice not to our wonder over the painterly magic, but 
to an experience of perplexity. Even such an appar-
ently perfectly unimportant – though very accurately 
positioned – motif is enough for Rembrandt to bring 
about a crisis of our convention-driven gaze, which 
seeks to identify/name things at all costs.
However, the game with the identity of the frame is 
no innocent pursuit. There is something subversive to 
it in that it questions, almost imperceptibly, the same 
established signs, codes, and collective certainties that 
form the foundations of his own personal representa-
tion, his expectations for the continued existence of the 
work, as well as the mission and future of painting as a 
social and public institution. What Rembrandt’s tricks 
undermine most is the status of the viewer, in whom 
the parergonally open work should come to comple-
tion – in accordance with Poussin’s or Velázquez’s 
“classical” teleology of the art of painting –, and whose 
position he himself still tried to define precisely in the 
cited works at Kassel and Copenhagen. The integrity 
of the self-portrait at Kenwood House is subverted, 
rather then restored, by the ambiguous instructions 
that the “frame game” provides as to the position 
the viewer should adopt, and what she should see 
(Fig. 12103).
Is not the elusive frame then Rembrandt’s own 
linea summa tenuitatis? Is it not the razor-sharp, 
though self-concealing, distinction between showing 
and indicating, which places, practically inconspicu-
ously, the personal presence of the painter between 
the quotation marks of the picture, and passes it on to 
posterity thus? Do not these quotes, left open indefi-
nitely, encase Rembrandt’s teleology of painting? Miss-
ing which, do we not miss the self-concealing differ-
ence between the two kinds of speech encoded in the 
picture? Because when we give in to the temptation 
of evident truth, the charm of presence, we will likely 
end up hearing only the confession of “it is I who paints 
here,” and ignore the eerie emptiness of the marks left 
to us from the past: the signs of absence, whose his-
torical message we can decipher, after a fashion, only 
while wandering in the performative labyrinth of the 
painting: “it was I who painted this.”
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NOTES
 1 Rembrandt: Self-Portrait with Two Circles, 1665; oil 
on canvas, 114.3×94 cm; London, Kenwood House, The 
Iveagh Bequest, inv. no. 57. See Corpus IV 2005, IV 23.
 2 Rembrandt: Self-Portrait with Easel, 1660; oil on can-
vas, 110.9×90.6 cm; Paris, Louvre, inv. no. 1747. Corpus 
IV 2005, IV 19; Br. 53.
 3 Rembrandt: Self-Portrait as Zeuxis, 1662–63; oil on can-
vas, 82.5×65 cm; Köln, Wallraf-Richartz Museum, inv.no. 
2526. Corpus IV 2005, IV 25; Br. 61. On its iconography, 
cf. Blankert 1973.
 4 The very early, stunning little genre painting, Artist in 
His Studio (1629, Boston, Br. 419), could hardly be consid-
ered a self-portrait in the emphatic sense.
 5 chApmAn 1990, 98.
 6 Bródy 1924, 140.
 7 gAdAmer 2004, 60–61.
 8 simmel 1917/2005, 27.
 9 To cite only the most important ones: Die ästhetische 
Bedeutung des Gesichtes (1901), in simmel,	G.: Das Individ-
uum und die Freiheit, Essais, Berlin, 1984, 140–145; Ästhetik 
des Porträts (1905), in simmel: Vom Wesen der Moderne. Es-
says zur Philosophie und Ästhetik, hrsg. v. Jung,	w., Ham-
burg, 1990. 277–293; Das Problem des Porträts (1918), in 
simmel: Zur Philosophie der Kunst, Philosophische und kunst-
philosophische Aufsätze, hrsg. von simmel, Gert, Potsdam, 
1922. 96–109.
 10 simmel 1917/2005, 18.
 11 simmel	1917/2005, 17.
 12 simmel 1917/2005, 98–100.
 13 simmel	1917/2005, 20.
 14 It is a well-known fact that Simmel’s philosophy, which 
stems from the Romantic tradition, emerged as a cultural 
critical reflection on the increasingly materialistic social life 
of the turn of the century, as well as its intellectual under-
pinnings, positivism and historicism (and art historiography 
of a like persuasion): in this regard, the philosophy of the 
portrait, expounded in Rembrandt and based on the imme-
diacy of the aesthetic consciousness, can be read as the ideal 
type of the extraordinary, redeeming function attributed to 
art, as a kind of aesthetic utopia. Note that in Simmel the 
absolutely autonomous work of art is “unrelated to reality,” 
its truth is above even the alternatives of “appearance or re-
ality.”
 15 On the victory of “life that leaves behind form,” cf. neu-
mAnn 1922, Vol. I, 32. On his part, Neumann sums up the 
psychology of the late portraits thus: “More and more, Rem-
brandt withdraws into himself: there is something distrustful 
in what his face expresses, something that is almost hostilely 
defensive and is not without bitterness: this should suggest 
what a fine, sensitive soul this man had... both admired in his 
life and knocked around, he was never broken. He amassed 
a devilish will power – though it was the will to resist, not 
to act –, and this is what informs the defensive expression 
that marks all his late paintings [...] He has reached a victori-
ous height where his ever-growing knowledge will no longer 
lead him astray.” In this context, Neumann represents the 
picture at Kenwood House as self-idealization in the form 
of a noble old man, as self-representation in the guise of a 
“sovereign.” But this has none of “the euphoria of victory or 
the posturing of the victor. He looks at us bitterly, yet certain 
of his self-identity, confidently in possession of the rights he 
has won; a hunted, abandoned, dethroned king – yet still 
stately, still a king.” Cf. neumAnn 1922, Vol. II, 541–543.
 16 In his 1948 monograph, Jakob Rosenberg, for instance, 
places the emphasis on Rembrandt’s search for objectiv-
ity, rather than his egocentrism. The visitor, he writes, of 
an imaginary exhibition of all of Rembrandt’s self-portraits 
could not but “be impressed by the ceaseless and unsparing 
observation which the paintings reflect, showing a gradual 
change from outward description and characterization to 
the most penetrating self-analysis and self-contemplation. 
[...] Rembrandt seems to have felt that he had to know him-
self if he wished to penetrate the problem of man’s inner 
life” rosenBerg 1948, 37. Fritz Erpel thinks Rembrandt’s 
self-representations reveal first the rise of a talented, ambi-
tious bourgeois, then the story of how a lonely creator who 
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considers his world ever more critically is forced on the de-
fensive, which eventually leads, in the late works, to the fi-
nal meditations of an artist who “withdraws more and more 
from society, while getting closer and closer to humanity”.
Cf. erpel 1969, 55.
 17 pinder 1943, 3. The topos already appears in Neu-
mann, who thinks Rembrandt’s series of portraits is compa-
rable to the autobiographies of the greatest authors, such as 
St Augustine, Rousseau or Goethe. Cf. neumAnn 1922, Vol. 
II, 538.
 18 Cf. dilthey 1900/1996.
 19 pinder 1943, 97–98.
 20 pinder	1943, ibid.
 21 Nowhere in his lengthy work does Simmel examine 
how that “unfolding” takes place in a given picture, nowhere 
does he register original, unusual visual experiences, and 
where he does ask “what can we see in the picture,” he pro-
vides general answers. simmel 1917/2005, 138–145.
 22 Simmel himself disputes in his foreword whether 
scholarly scrutiny can ever get close to the totalizing experi-
ence of unity that the aesthetic experience offers. Cf. simmel 
1917/2005, 5–7.
 23 For a comprehensive overview of the problem, cf. vAn	
de	wetering	1999, 17ff. Cf. also the introduction of Corpus 
IV 2005, XXIIIff.
 24 For a detailed summary, cf. chenAult-porter	 1988, 
189. For the current state of research, cf. Corpus IV 2005, 
XXXIV, IV–26, 565–568.
 25 weisBAch 1926, 536.
 26 “...de twee half-ronden van een als wandversiering di-
enende wereldkaaart”: vAn	de	wAAl 1956, 199.
 27 Jan Miense Molenaer: The Painter in His Studio, cca. 
1631; oil on canvas, 86×127 cm; Berlin, Gemäldegalerie.
 28 BAuch 1966, 17, n. 331. 
 29 chApmAn 1990, 99ff.
 30 The map of the spheres on the wall of Rembrandt’s stu-
dio would then indicate the kind of universality that Samuel 
van Hoogstraten demanded of all painters of significance in 
the foreword of his Inleyding tot de Hooge Schoole der Schil-
derkonst (cf. hoogstrAten 1678). In the etching of the title 
page, Clio, the muse of fate, is among those who show the 
painters-to-be the way to the future: the “universe” is sym-
bolized by the globe in the lower right corner, bisected by 
the edge of the picture. Chapman suggests there is a good 
reason for the subtitle of the tome, De Zichtbaere Werelt, or, 
The Visible World: Hoogstraten considers the visibility of 
the world a challenge which only the painter can tackle; a 
heroic achievement that compares to that of the philoso-
pher, who reveals the laws of the invisible world. Cf. chAp-
mAn 1990, 99.
 31 de	BeAuFort 1957, 112–113.
 32 vAn	gelder 1949, 408–409. It also detracts from the 
persuasive power of his assumption that the circles whose 
movement Aristotle discusses in Mechanica are concentric. 
Cf. moFFit 1984, 63, and 67, n. 2.
 33 emmens 1968, 174–175. Both Broos and Moffit point 
out that Emmens’ speculation is wrong because Ripa’s fig-
ures concern measuring, not drawing.
 34 moFFit 1984, 63–70.
 35 Broos 1970.
 36 vAsAri 1551/1878–1885, Vol. I, 383.
 37 vAn	mAnder	1604, Vol. III, fol. 96b.
 38 Which he then eliminated in the fifth version. Cf. Rem-
brandt: Lieven Willemsz. Van Coppenol. B. 282. Cf. schwArtz 
1977, B. 282.
 39 At the end of his story van Mander quotes the saying 
on somebody’s fatness “You are much rounder then the O of 
Giotto” from Vasari. See Broos 1970, 175, n. 40.
 40 Broos 1970, 182.
 41 Several details of the painting, especially the hand with 
the palette, must have filled classicistic art lovers with hor-
ror, because they are far from being “finely” executed. Hou-
braken’s criticism of Rembrandt’s technique, which he com-
mitted to paper in 1719, reflects the opinion of the paint-
er’s contemporaries, handed down as oral tradition: “One 
regrettable circumstance is that he was so quick to make 
changes, or compelled to try something new, that he only 
half-finished many of his things, paintings as well as prints. 
The ones that are finished give us an idea of what a mag-
nificent [oeuvre] we should have had from his hand had he 
finished everything in the same measure [of excellence] as 
he began ... It went the same way with his paintings. I have 
seen some with [passages where] the objects were brought 
to a high degree of finish while the rest was smeared on 
without regard for drawing, as if it were done with a coarse 
tar-brush. Nor was he to be budged on this point. His an-
swer was that a piece was finished when the master had 
achieved his intention in it.” houBrAken 1718–1721, Vol. I. 
259. The complete text of the second edition of 1753 can be 
found at http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/houb005groo01_01/in-
dex.htm. The English translation is from Broos 1970, 182.
 42 vAn	de	wetering	1997, 87.
 43 pliny, Naturalis Historia, XXXV. 81–83. Kris and Kurz 
summarize the story thus: “In Pliny’s version, Apelles vis-
its Protogenes’ house on Rhodes and, in his host’s absence, 
draws an exquisitely fine line on a panel. Without making 
his presence known in any other way, he leaves it behind 
as a kind of visiting card. Protogenes recognizes the hand 
of Apelles, paints a second, even thinner line over that of 
Apelles, and hides when Apelles repeats his visit in the hope 
that he will witness Protogenes’ discomfiture. Apelles, how-
ever, succeeds in painting a third line on top of the second 
one. Duris, who is credited with the invention of this tale 
... here pins the theme of the artists’ rivalry ... to the art-
ist’s most abstract accomplishment. In later times, repeated 
attempts were made to give this story different and more 
lively reinterpretations. Entirely in keeping with what the 
early Quattrocento deemed to be the most important artistic 
task, Lorenzo Ghiberti […] proposed that one had to as-
sume that it was problems of perspective in which Apelles 
and Protogenes were trying to outdo one another. Such re-
interpretations, however, deprive the anecdote of its exem-
plary content – which is nothing other than sheer virtuosity. 
A modern variation of the same theme is the story of Giotto 
who, to prove his mastery, drew a perfect circle freehand in 
the presence of an astonished papal emissary.” kris–kurz	
1934/1979, 96–97.
 44 miedemA 1971, 185–186.
 45 vAn	de	wAAl	1967; pliny 1952.
 46 vAn	de	wAAl	quotes pliny: Naturalis historia XXXV, 81. 
The English translation is Pliny 1952, IX, 323.
 47 Let meg quote van Mander: “But to give my opinion 
freely, I do not believe that these were simple straight lines 
or strokes, as many think who are not painters, but rather 
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a contour of an arm or a leg, or a profile of a face or some-
thing similar, which were very delicately set down in various 
colours and intersecting with each other in various places, 
which Pliny meant to indicate by cleaving (secuit). For the 
scholars who are not well acquainted with our art write and 
speak about it uncomprehendingly. And I strengthen my 
case with the fact that Pliny asserts that those who had an 
understanding of painting were very much astonished and 
amazed by it. From this one can conclude that it was skilful 
contours and not simple lines that these two most excel-
lent masters of our art had drawn in competition with each 
other; for many a schoolmaster can draw a straight line free-
hand while writing, or someone else who is no painter often 
can do better than the best painter in the world; and such 
a thing is considered no high achievement among painters, 
since they can use a ruler for it. But the knowledgeable in 
art are astonished and delighted when they see a character-
istic and skilful contour, cleverly set down with the greatest 
knowledge, wherein the art of drawing consists in the full-
est measure; but they would walk by straight lines without 
paying attention.” vAn	mAnder 1604, fol 78r. The English 
translation is from vAn	de	wAAl 1967, 6.
 48 ApollinAire 1912/1960.
 49 vAn	de	wAAl	1967, 12.
 50 gomBrich	1976, 15–18.
 51 In a footnote of his cited study (Broos 1970, 181, n. 
48) Broos refers to an article from the early twentieth cen-
tury, in which Jan Six suggests, only to dismiss the idea, that 
the two circles in the picture at Kenwood House may have 
something to do with the legend recorded by Pliny. Cf. Six 
1908, 65.
 52 schwArtz 1984/1991, 352.
 53 In English: An Expression of Gratitude to the Excel-
lent and Widely Renowned Rembrandt van Rijn, in strAuss	
–	vAn	der	meulen 1979, 172–173. Cf. also: emmens 1968, 
205, and chenAult-porter	1988.
 54 Nor does Gombrich leave the motif unmentioned, 
though he cites Pliny as the source. Cf. gomBrich 1976.
 55 “...om ene enkele parel kracht te doen hebben, een schone 
Cleopatra zou hebben overtaant”. houBrAken 1718–1721, 
Vol. I, 259. For a careful interpretation of the passage, cf. 
vAn	de	wetering	1997, 167–168.
 56 schwArtz 1984/1991, 354.
 57 I cannot discuss here the modernist and formalist read-
ings of the painting at Kenwood House, but it is certainly 
true that its unusual composition does encourage some to 
draw bold conclusions. Even the influential Rembrandt ex-
pert and great connoisseur Horst Gerson was sceptical about 
attaching an allegorical or symbolic explanation to the cir-
cles. In his 1968 oeuvre catalogue, a revision of Bredius’s 
1935 catalogue of the paintings, he lent his support to the 
position that the motifs in question merely serve to empha-
size the geometric structure of the picture, “void [as they are] 
of all informational or decorative content, presenting them-
selves as pure geometric forms. This kind of abstractionism 
is also expressed in the palette, brushes, and maulstick, 
though these remain legible as objects.” Cf. gerson 1968, 
142. Cf. also cat. no. [380], 503. Gerson too cites the edito-
rial of The Burlington Magazine on the 1950 reopening of 
the Iveagh Bequest at Kenwood House, in which the editor 
regretted that the late Roger Fry, the legendary proponent 
of the moderns, did not live to see the splendid Rembrandt 
in its cleaned state, “since of all the self-portraits, the Ken-
wood picture is structurally the most rigid and, therefore, 
the one on which he could have been most enlightening. It 
seems as though Rembrandt, soaring across two centuries, 
had wished to experiment with straight lines and curves, to 
try out on a private canvas for possible public use certain de-
vices that tend towards geometry. No other explanation will 
fit the circles on the wall behind him, the angular, ‘unreal-
istic’ contours of the right sleeve, the diagrammatic palette, 
the continuation of the line of the mahlstick into the back-
ground, or the studied placing of the head a little to the left 
to allow for the inclusion of the sharp triangle of canvas in 
the top right-hand corner. ([Footnote:] The canvas had been 
painted out, and was only revealed on cleaning. The picture 
had been heavily varnished in the frame, as is proved by a 
strip under the frame which showed the original tone and 
colour of the background.) The name of Cézanne must inev-
itably spring to the mind of even the most austere historian 
when faced with this fur collar, rendered in superimposed, 
rectangular, flat areas of paint, or with the right sleeve, in-
dicated by a series of overlapping, quilt-like patches, almost 
unknown to art before 1885. Yet the portrait is much more 
than ‘modern,’ more than a startling essay in composition: 
its geometry is only the solid framework in which fierce sen-
sations are left to glow.” The Burlington Magazine, Editorial, 
No. 568. Vol. XCII, July 1950.
 58 If, as Blankert instructs us (cf. BlAnkert 1973), we con-
sider the Laughing Self-Portrait of Cologne (Fig. 3) from the 
perspective of the 1685 Self-Portrait with Zeuxis (Frankfurt 
am Main, Städel), by Aert de Gelder, a student of Rem-
brandt, it becomes evident that the silhouette of a face in 
the upper left corner in fact appears on a canvas facing the 
viewer.
 59 Cf. Kat. London – The Hague 1999, cat. No. 83, 220.
 60 Cf. Corpus IV 2005, IV 26, 564–565.
 61 chApmAn 2005, 126.
 62 Though it is not uncommon for the head and the torso 
to make a contrast-rich appearance before the background 
like a silhouette (e.g. Br.59, Rijksmuseum), nowhere else 
can we see a support of this kind, which runs through the 
entire width of the picture field, and is barely differentiated 
and highly planar in effect.
 63 Cf. my study on the Copenhagen Emmaus: rényi 2007.
 64 Cf. Wolfgang Kemp’s monograph on the Kassel Holy 
Family: kemp 1986.
 65 Cf. stoichitA 1998, 235–257.
 66 kemp 2001, 240.
 67 pAscAl, Blaise: Pensées, Section 10, par. 678.
 68 BätschmAnn 1982, 60.
 69 Marin thinks the main reason we cannot see the picture 
with the allegory of Painting is not the grey canvas but the 
fact that it “is hidden by the painting at which we are look-
ing along with Poussin and Chantelou.” The subject of the 
picture is painting, which becomes visible in this very “in 
between,” this rift, as does the subject of the painting, the 
painter himself. Cf. mArin 1999, 202.
 70 Poussin’s letter to Chantelou, 19 June, 1650; quoted in 
kemp 2001, 240.
 71 kemp 2001, 240.
 72 Which, as we know, did come about eventually, unlike 
in the case of Poussin. Cf. Corpus IV 2005, 28, 311; Cf. also 
mAnuth 1999, 48ff.
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 73 In his letters to Constantijn Huygens, Rembrandt fre-
quently declares he hopes his paintings will receive adequate 
illumination: when on 27 January, 1639, he sends a picture 
as a gift to the secretary (probably The Blinding of Samson, 
now at the Städel, Frankfurt), he makes a point of warning 
him about the proper way of hanging it, “so it will sparkle 
at its best.” On Rembrandt’s correspondance with Huygens, 
cf. gerson 1961. Also of interest here is an anecdote handed 
down by Houbraken about Rembrandt shooing away a visi-
tor who tried to look at a painting too closely, warning that 
“the smell of the oil paint will make you sick.” houBrAken 
1718–1721, Vol. 1, 269. 
 74 As regards its size, the painting hidden from the view-
er, on which he is working, corresponds to the real canvas 
at the Prado: the play with the identity of the real and the 
painted painting, with the mirror and the models, as well as 
Velázquez’s unparalleled representational power, together 
create a paradoxical illusion of reality, which is probably 
best summed up by Théophile Gautier’s famous exclama-
tion: “Mais où est donc le tableau?” As we shall see, Rem-
brandt also made use of the effect in the Kenwood portrait.
 75 kemp 2001, 242.
 76 c.	genette	1972.
 77 Boehm 1995, 29–36; müller 1997.
 78 His argument is that art involves the viewer similarly 
to how a player enters a game: the work of art offers certain 
shared (culturally inherited) rules, and requires her to know 
and accept them, as well as to subordinate her subjective 
goals to the occurrence of the shared event she is ready to 
take part in. As a good player will want to win (will enjoy 
the game) only through adherence to the mutually accepted 
rules, so a good recipient will not yield to a whim, to the 
assertiveness of her subjectivity, when experiencing and as-
sessing a work of art. She knows it is not the occasional 
object of experience she can simply invade and “use” at will, 
and consequently agrees to follow its “rules” when entering 
its domain. The form of the work of art may be nothing 
but a system of instructions, directions and allusions for the 
observer, which the good viewer (one who is competent, 
and knows and understands the rules) can and is willing 
to pay attention to, seek out and follow. She does so while 
knowing that delights, torments and insights await her in 
the course of this active observation – she is ready to expose 
herself to unknown experiences.
 79 wAldenFels 2004, 220f.
 80 Though he is known to have painted a large number of 
self-portraits, Rembrandt seldom used objective-spatial in-
dicators (banisters, room interiors, cast shadows, etc.) to po-
sition the figure in space: even the early works are marked 
by a concentration on the face and the expression, which 
necessarily entails the semantic voiding of the visual envi-
ronment. Figuratively speaking, the background is pushed 
more and more into the background, usually becoming a 
mere negativity, a contrasting foil without which the figure 
could not emerge, of course, but which is reduced to virtual 
invisibility. Even in his self-portraits, Rembrandt often cre-
ates the illusory power of personal presence by suppressing 
the elementary dialectic of the picture, the dialogue of figure 
and ground.
 81 See gomBrich 1960, 181–287; houBrAken 1718–1721, 
Vol. I. 259. 
 82 Cf. vAn	de	wetering	2005, 305.
 83 Corpus IV 2005, 308.
 84 The painting in question is Woman with Carnation 
(Br. 398) at the Statens Museum for Kunst, Copenhagen, 
dated to 1656, in which the surface of the face is marked 
by what is doubtlessly an extremely fine brushwork. E. 
van de Wetering also highlights the broader art historical 
context of the representation of human skin. In addition 
to Lampsonius, he also quotes Vasari’s biography of Leon-
ardo, the passage on Mona Lisa (“The eyebrows, through 
his [Leonardo’s] having shown the manner in which the 
hairs spring from the flesh, here more close and here more 
scanty, and curve according to the pores of the skin, could 
not be more natural”), as well as Hoogstraten’s remark on 
the same painting: “One sensed the little sweat holes in the 
tender skin.” Cf. Hoogstraten 1678, 239. Quoted in vAn	de	
wetering	2005, 309.
 85 Van de Wetering does not make the connection even 
though he quotes an expert of the physiology of vision, ac-
cording to whom “in attempting to focus the optical im-
age properly, the eye will hunt for critical details in the 
visual scene, a similar process that occurs when one tries 
to get a slide focussed on a projection screen. Last, but not 
least, there is also the aspect of mental focus, the mind’s 
eye, which is attracted by details contrasting with the more 
roughly painted surround. All these effects work in the di-
rection of locking the viewer’s eye on to the face in the por-
trait, and making this face manifest itself in an inescapable 
manner” (vAn	de	wetering	2005, 307, n. 415).
 86 gomBrich 1960, 184f. Also of interest here is Rem-
brandt’s alleged remark, cited by Houbraken in the passage 
already quoted: “[H]e worked quickly, particularly in his last 
period, when his work, seen from nearby, would look as if 
it was smeared on with a trowel. Which is why, when peo-
ple came to his studio and wanted to see his work at close 
range, he would pull them back saying ‘the smell of paint 
will bother you’” houBrAken 1718–1721, Vol. I. 259. See 
also my former discussion of The Return of the Prodigal Son, in 
which I propose a possible aesthetic strategy for the suspen-
sion of acute vision. Cf. rényi 1999, particularly 82–101.
 87 This was how he avoided looking left-handed. See the 
X-ray image in Corpus IV 2005 26, Fig. 2, 563. It is analyzed 
on page 565.
 88 Cf. e.g. schAmA 1999, 670.
 89 Alpers 1988.
 90 Houbraken could just as well describe this work: 
“Among a multitude of his portraits that were worthy of 
fame there was one ... that he had painted after his own like-
ness which was so artfully and powerfully elaborated that 
even the most vigorous brushwork of Van Dyck and Rubens 
could not match it, aye, the head appeared to protrude from 
it and address the beholders.” Houbraken, De Groote Schow-
burg, ed. cited, 12. The English translation is from Corpus IV 
2005, 275.
 91 Berger 2000, 497ff.
 92 Cf. note 50.
 93 pliny, Hist. Nat. XXXV. 88.
 94 Translation from Broos 1970, 170. 
 95 kris–kurz	1934/1979, 96.
 96 Launched in 1969, the scientistic Rembrandt Research 
Project (RRP) is based on the positivist notion that “author-
ship is the sum of physical conditions.” For a critical view of 
the programme, cf. schwArtz 1993.
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 97 krAuss 1985.
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 99 This could be the link surmised by C. H. A. Broos, 
between Rembrandt’s “unfinished” style and the circles as 
symbols of perfection. The performative reading I propose 
may even obviate the rather fruitless debate about the ques-
tion of completedness. Whoever ascribes the “sketchiness” 
of the lower part of the painting to mere incompletedness 
(implicitly expecting, that is, a future state in which things 
have reached their “final,” finished form), practically falls 
for the trick of the painting, and cannot help seeing it as the 
complete representation of fixed identities. Cf. Broos 1970, 
182–183, n. 51.
 100 There is no room here to elaborate on how Rembrandt 
provides different emphases and directions of content for 
the performative games that these paintings – the one at 
Kassel more playful, the other at Copenhagen disconsolately 
mournful – play with their viewers.
 101 The material inspection of the painting at Kenwood 
House has suggested that the canvas was trimmed (cf. Cor-
pus IV 2005 , 26, 564), but by no more than a few centi-
metres on the right. The “canvas on the canvas” effect was 
thus probably more readily recognizable, but the suggestion 
that they were identical was still far more extraordinary than 
what was common at the time.
 102 Cf. stoichitA 2001, 211.
 103 Magritte’s famous La condition humaine (1933) (Fig. 12) 
could be considered a verification of this “non-classical,” 
Rembrandtean teleology of painting; it too makes use of 
the metaleptic embedding of a picture within the picture, 
and the elusiveness of the inner frame (Cf. müller 1997). 
The relationship of the two works is of course not a case of 
the former influencing the latter: Magritte was not in any 
way directly interested in Rembrandt or the masterpiece at 
Kenwood House. Nevertheless, both are parts of the same 
universal–European discourse about the nature of the ea-
sel painting and of autonomous (modern) painting. After 
all, Magritte thematizes an essential metaphor of this dis-
course, Alberti’s finestra aperta – by making the painting that 
is placed in the window coincide with the garden which it 
represents and which the window overlooks. The picture 
practically posits a logical paradox, the quintessential iden-
tity of “reality” and “likeness” – also the highest utopia of 
painting in Alberti –, and presents it as the optical continu-
ity of the real painting and the one included, interrupted 
only by a thin edge. The “real” painting representing the 
room and the “fictitious” painting in the plane of the win-
dow share a line of sight, though their picture planes do 
not coincide. Magritte escalates the subversive power of the 
iconic difference that is already manifest in Rembrandt, and 
heightens it to an open paradox. Given the above, note that 
while Magritte employs the motifs, theorems and language 
of painting, his work already has little to do with painting. 
It is more of a painted, meta-painterly philosopheme than 
a painterly work: in no way does its understanding require 
the eye to perform the activity that reveals and realizes the 
iconic differences of paintings. Its language, which is de-
cidedly neutral from a painterly perspective, the even illu-
mination, the unproblematic, harmonized arrangement of 
surfaces, contours and colours, all serve a single purpose: to 
create the evident texture of the pure presentness and logi-
cal continuity of the objective world which his intellectual 
gag can tear up impressively. As it happens, the provocative 
absurdity of his act is rooted in the openness and immediacy 
of positing the deeply ambivalent as undeniably unambigu-
ous. Magritte’s painting implies a perfectly impersonal and 
motionless gaze, not merely not requiring, but expressly 
preventing, the viewer from bringing it in motion by her 
presence. It is a picture in which, once the joke has been 
understood, there is nothing left to see.
